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1.  Introduction 
 
  During the past half century, by subscribing to various central planning paradigms 
of development, developing and transition economies (hereafter referred to as DTEs) by 
and large followed a path of centralization. As a result, they are more centralized today 
than industrial countries were in their early stages of development. A number of recent 
developments, discussed below, are prompting most DTEs to re-examine the respective 
roles of levels of government, the private sector and the civil society as partners in 
development
2. This paper examines the reasons for the rekindling of interest in fiscal 
rearrangements in DTEs and reviews the progress to-date by using a systemic framework. 
It draws general and institutional lessons to advance the agenda for creating an enabling 
environment for responsive and accountable local governance. An overall conclusion of 
the paper is that citizen voice, choice and exit options are critical to the success of 
decentralized decision making. These areas require significant attention in the on-going 
reform efforts.   
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of the 
motivation behind the mega change. Section 3 provides a simple framework to evaluate 
and cope with the forces of change. Section 4 reviews the broad trends in the division of 
powers in DTEs and their implications for public sector governance. Section 5 reviews 
the operational capacity and orientation of the public sector in support of the reform 
efforts. Finally, Section 6 draws general lessons from experience in adapting to a 
changing world.   
 
2. The Quest for the Right Balance 
 
  The reasons for rethinking fiscal arrangements are manifold and the importance of 
each factor is country specific. Nevertheless, generic catalysts for change include: (i) the 
                                                 
2 This rethinking has caused much heated controversy and debate in development policy fora. Regrettably, 
this debate has focused on straw men of “centralization” vs “decentralization”. Contrary to focus in this  
debate, the fiscal federalism literature is concerned with clarifying assignment of responsibilities among 
different levels of government in support of good governance.    
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collapse of economies with collective ownership and control; (ii) desire to breakaway 
from the vestiges of colonialism and ethnic strife as in Africa; (iii) central government 
failures in securing national objectives; (iv) beggar-thy-neighbor and fend-for-yourself 
federalism policies of sub-national governments; (v) assertion of basic rights of citizens 
by the courts; (vi) globalization of economic activities; and  (vii) the demonstration 
effects of the European Union and Latin America.  The demise of the collective 
ownership model prompted a major change in government organization and geographical 
boundaries of some countries, especially in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union. 
These countries sought guidance from the principles and practices pursued in industrial 
countries where market preserving systems of public decision making have evolved over 
a long period of time.  
In Africa, both former French and English colonies inherited highly centralized 
systems of governance geared toward command and control with little concern for 
citizens’ preferences. Resolution of ethnic conflicts required greater protection of 
minority rights in politically disenfranchised and fragmented societies in Africa. Political 
reforms in Latin America empowered people who in turn demanded greater 
accountability from their governments. In most countries, national governments have 
failed to ensure regional equity, economic union, central bank independence, a stable 
macroeconomic environment or local autonomy.  The record of sub-national 
governments is also not very commendable. Sub-national governments have often 
followed beggar-thy-neighbor policies, sought free ridership with no accountability and, 
in pursuit of narrow self-interest, undermined national unity. The judicial systems in 
some countries are also providing stimuli for change by providing a broader 
interpretation of basic rights and requiring that national and sub-national legislation 
conform to the basic rights of citizens.  
The emergence of a new “borderless” world economy complicates this picture by 
bringing new challenges to constitutional federalism (see Courchene 1995). These 
challenges arise from the decline of nation-states in carrying out regulation of certain 
economic activities as borders have become more porous and information technology has 
weakened their ability to control information flows.  With globalization, it is increasingly 
becoming apparent that nation-states are too small to tackle large things in life and too  
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large to address small things. More simply nation states are fast losing control of some of 
their areas of traditional control and regulation such as regulation of external trade, 
telecommunications, and financial transactions. National governments are experiencing 
diminished control in their ability to control the flow of goods and services, ideas and 
cultural products. These difficulties are paving way for the emergence of specialized 
institutions of global governance such as the World Trade Organization, Global 
Environment Facility with many more to follow especially institutions to regulate 
information technology, satellite communications, and international financial 
transactions. Thus nation states would be confederalizing in the coming years and 
relinquishing responsibilities in these areas to supranational institutions. This trend, 
however, contributes to a democracy deficit as citizens do not have the possibility of 
direct input in vital decision making by supranational institutions.  
The European Union’s policies and principles regarding subsidiarity
3, fiscal 
harmonization and stabilization checks are also having demonstrable effects on DTEs’ 
policies. Similarly the success of decentralization in improving public participation, 
efficiency and equity of public provision and accountability of the public sector in some 
Latin American countries, especially Brazil, Chile and Colombia, has inspired other 
countries to have a review of own fiscal arrangements (see Wiesner, 1994).  Finally, 
resurgence of interest in the new public management and federalism principles and 
practices has served as a powerful basis to restructure and re-orient the public sector.   
 
Emerging Governance Structure 
This re-examination has resulted in a silent revolution sweeping the globe. This 
silent revolution is slowly but gradually bringing about rearrangements that embody 
diverse features of supra-nationalization, confederalization, centralization, 
provincialization and localization.  Nevertheless, the vision of a governance structure that 
is slowly taking hold through this silent revolution is the one that indicates a gradual shift 
from unitary constitutional structures to federal or confederal form of governance for a 
                                                 
3 The subsidiarity principle states that public service responsibilities must be exercised by the lowest level 
of government unless a convincing case can be made for higher level assignment.  
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large majority of people
4. It implies that we are likely to move from a centralized to a 
globalized and localized world
5. The role of the central governments in such a world 
would change from that of a managerial authority to a leadership role in a multi-centered 
government environment.  The culture of governance is also slowing changing from a 
bureaucratic to a participatory mode of operation; from command and control to 
accountability for results; from being internally dependent to being competitive and 
innovative; from being closed and slow to being open and quick; and from that of 
intolerance for risk to allowing freedom to fail or succeed. Financial crises around the 
world encouraging protectionist policies are hampering this change and as a result the 
new vision will take some time to shape in the 21st century (see Table 1) and in many 
DTEs as this vision may not actually materialize for some time due to the institutional 
impediments noted in the following sections. 
 
Table 1:  Governance Structure—20th Versus 21st Century 
20th Century  21st Century 
♦  Unitary 
♦  Centralized 
♦  Center manages 
♦  Bureaucratic 
♦  Command and control 
♦  Input controls 
♦  Top down accountability 
♦  Internally dependent 
♦  Closed and slow 
♦  Intolerance of risk 
 
♦  Federal/confederal 
♦  Globalized and localized 
♦  Center leads 
♦  Participatory 
♦  Responsive and accountable to citizens 
♦  Results matter 
♦  Bottom-up accountability 
♦  Competitive 
♦  Open and quick 
♦  Freedom to fail/succeed 
 
The overall thrust of these changes manifest a trend toward either devolution 
(empowering people politically) and/or localization (decentralization of decision making 
                                                 
4 A unitary country has a single or multi-tiered government in which effective control of government 
functions rests with the central government. A federal form of government has a multilayered structure 
with decision making shared by all levels of government. In a confederal system of government, the central 
government serves as the agent of member units, usually without independent taxing and spending powers. 
The European Union is an important example of a confederal form of government. Switzerland has a 
confederal constitution but is considered a federal country in practice.  
5 The total number of countries have risen from 140 in 1975 to 192  in 2001 and of these 25% were 
democracies in 1975 compared to 60% in 2001.  In 2001, there are 24 federal countries with 25.4% of the 
world population with another 20 decentralized unitary countries with some federal features having 35% of 
world population (see also Watts, 1999). The World Bank has had programs in support of decentralization 
in 74 countries during 1986-2001.     
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to the local level). Localization has been pursued through varying combinations of 
political, administrative and fiscal decentralization initiatives. Political or democratic 
decentralization implies directly elected local governments thereby making elected 
officials accountable to citizens. Administrative decentralization empowers these 
governments to hire and fire local staff (thereby making local officials accountable to 
elected officials) without any reference to higher level governments. Fiscal 
decentralization ensures that all elected officials weigh carefully the joys of spending 
some one else’s money as well as pains associated with raising revenues from the 
electorate and facing the possibility of being voted out.  Administrative deconcentration, 
where decision making is shifted to regional and local offices of the central government, 
would not be consistent with administrative decentralization. Similarly administrative 
delegation where local governments undertake activities on behalf of the higher level 
governments falls short of administrative decentralization. Thus, localization of authority 
is intended to bring decision making closer to the people being served by the public 
sector. This change has proven to be a controversial proposition in DTEs. This is because 
localization is being perceived both as a solution to problems such as a dysfunctional 
public sector and lack of voice and exit, as well as a source of new problems such as 
capture by local elites and aggravation of macroeconomic management due to lack of 
fiscal discipline and perverse fiscal behavior by sub-national units. There are also 
conceptual difficulties in making choices on the right balance. (see Shah, 1994 and 
Boadway, Roberts and Shah, 1994).  Beyond these conceptual issues, a number of 
practical considerations have a bearing on the quest for balance within a nation. These 
include the level of popular participation in general elections, feudal politics, civil service 
culture and incentives, governance and accountability structure and capacities of local 
governments.  
 
 3. Leading Change: Developing a Vision and a Strategy 
 
  Coping with or adapting to this silent revolution requires a vision and a strategy in 
the absence of which a nation may not have full control of its destiny. A closer look at the 
public sector’s mission and values, its authorizing environment and its operational  
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capacity in DTEs yields important insights in understanding the dysfunctionality of 
public governance.  
(a)  Public sector vision or public sector mission and values.  Societal mission and  
values as embodied in the constitution or in annual budget policy statements, may be 
useful points of reference for public sector mandates and the values inherent in these 
mandates  
(b)  Authorizing environment. The authorizing environment represents the institutional 
mechanisms to translate constitutional mission to concrete objectives and actions. 
These include societal norms, formal and informal rules, procedures and 
organizations dealing with participation, consultation, policy making, and 
accountability. Legislative, coordination and oversight bodies are important 
elements of the authorizing environment.  These institutions ensure that the public 
sector is solely focused on citizen aspirations. In Switzerland, legislative bodies, 
fiscal rules and popular referenda on major budgetary proposals ensure that 
citizens preferences are respected.   
(c)  Operational capacity and constraints.  The skills, motivations and commitment of 
the executive branch represents the operational  capacity. What is authorized is not 
necessarily what will get done as the available operational capacity may not be 
consistent with the task at hand.  Further, even the operational capacity that is 
available may be circumvented by the bureaucratic culture or incentives that reward 
command and control, and corruption and patronage.  
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  Figure 1:  Public Sector Institutional Environment 











  The challenge of public sector reform in any country is to harmonize the public 
sector’s mission and values, its authorizing environment and its operational capacity so 
that there is a close, if not perfect, correspondence among these three aspects of 
governance (see Figure 1). The intersection of these three elements has a bearing on the 
public sector performance in the delivery of its mandate. Thus the goal is to maximize 
this intersection.  Such a task is daunting for many DTEs since they often have lofty 
goals, but lack an authorizing environment that is capable of translating these goals into a 
policy framework.  This problem is often compounded further by bureaucratic incentives 
that make any available operational capacity to implement such a framework  
dysfunctional. 
      
4. Realigning the authorizing environment to a focus on societal goals 
 
Various levels of government will have a greater focus on societal goals if they 
and the citizens knew with some clarity their respective roles in public service delivery. 
This “assignment problem” or the division of powers among various levels of 
government has been the most fundamental issue in public governance from time 
immemorial. This remains a central concern in the literature of federalism. The 
Maastricht Treaty introduced a guiding principle, the “principle of subsidiarity” for 
assignment of responsibilities among members of the European Union. According to this  
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principle, taxing, spending and regulatory functions should be exercised by the lowest 
levels of government unless a convincing case can be made for assigning the same to 
higher levels of government. Fiscal federalism literature has also provided principles 
which broadly support the subsidiarity principle.  Stigler’s menu (Stigler, 1953) identifies 
two principles of jurisdictional design: (a) representative government works best closer it 
is to the people; and (b) people should have the right to vote for the kind and amount of 
public services they want.  Olson (1969) proposed “fiscal equivalency” as the criterion 
for jurisdictional design. According to this principle, political jurisdiction and the benefit 
area for public services must overlap to ensure that marginal benefit of provision equals 
its marginal costs and that there is no free ridership.  Oates refines these ideas further. 
The decentralization theorem advanced by Oates states that  “each public service should 
be provided by the jurisdiction having control over the minimum geographical area that 
would internalize benefits and costs of such provision” (Oates 1972, p.55).  This would 
imply assignment of functions such as national security and defense to the center and 
garbage collection and fire protection to the local level. In a related idea, the so-called 
“correspondence principle”, Oates (1972) has argued that the jurisdiction determining the 
level of provision of each public good should include precisely the set of individuals that 
consume it.  Application of these principles to achieve the right balance in the number 
and size of jurisdictions require operations of voting with feet (Tiebout, 1956), voting by 
ballots or other community formation processes (Buchanan, 1965) or redrawing of 
jurisdictional boundaries. 
In applying principles of jurisdictional design, the fiscal federalism literature 
argues that assigning responsibility for spending must precede or at least be done at the 
same time as assigning responsibility for taxation. This helps ensure better matching of 
taxing and spending powers for better accountability and avoid over-reliance on transfers 
in financing own expenditures. In the following, conceptual guidance and the practice on 
allocation of responsibilities are reviewed briefly. 
 
a. Clarifying Roles of Various Governments in Public Service Delivery  
Conceptually, central government expenditure responsibilities should include: (a) 
functions to preserve national efficiency objectives such as the maintenance of the  
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internal common market, provision or finance of efficient levels of public goods and 
services whose benefits transcend sub-national borders; (b)  those needed to safeguard 
national equity objectives such as vertical equity based upon incomes and other 
characteristics, horizontal or fiscal equity across regions and equality under the law 
through the legal framework; and (c) stabilization programs.  Responsibilities for all 
other functions are best exercised by regional and local governments. The national 
government can ensure attainment of minimum standards of public services through 
regulatory oversight or the conditional transfer of funds (see Appendix Table 1 for a 
representative assignment of expenditure responsibilities).  
Asymmetric arrangements may be useful if regions are heterogeneous in terms of 
population, skills, culture, size and economic base. The assignment of public services to 
various types of local and regional authorities requires taking into consideration factors 
such as economies of scale, economies of scope (proper bundling of local public services 
to improve efficiency through information and coordination economies and enhanced 
accountability through voter participation and cost recovery) and cost/benefit spillovers, 
proximity to beneficiaries, consumer preferences, and flexibility in budgetary choices on 
composition of spending. The particular level of government to which a service is 
assigned determines the public and/or private production and distribution of the service 
based upon considerations of efficiency and equity. As local governments’ financial 
capacities are quite limited in most developing and transition economies, fostering private 
sector participation in the delivery of local public services assumes a greater significance. 
Such participation enhances voice, choice and exit options for citizens. 
 
Special challenges in expenditure assignment from globalization 
In the emerging borderless world economy, interests of residents as citizens are 
often at odds with their interests as consumers. In securing their interests as consumers in 
the world economy, individuals are increasingly seeking localization and regionalization 
of public decision making to better safeguard their interests. With greater mobility of 
capital, and loosening of the regulatory environment for foreign direct investment, local 
governments as providers of infrastructure related services would serve as more 
appropriate channels for attracting such investment than national governments.  As  
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borders become more porous, cities are expected to replace countries in transnational 
economic alliances as people across Europe are already discovering that national 
governments have diminishing relevance in their lives. They are increasingly more 
inclined to link their identities and allegiances to cities and regions. 
  With mobility of capital and other inputs, skills rather than resource endowments  
will determine international competitiveness. Education and training typically however is 
a sub-national government responsibility.  Therefore, there would be a need to realign 
this responsibility by giving the national government a greater role in skills enhancement 
through education and training.  The new economic environment will also polarize the 
distribution of income in favor of skilled workers, accentuating income inequalities and 
possibly eliminating lower-middle-income classes. Since the national governments may 
not have the means to deal with this social policy fallout, sub-national governments 
working in tandem with national governments would have to devise strategies in dealing 
with the emerging crisis in social policy. 
International trade agreements typically embody social policy provisions. But 
social policy is typically an area of sub-national government responsibility as in Canada, 
Brazil, India, Pakistan and the United States. This is an emerging area for conflict among 
different levels of government. To avoid these conflicts, a guiding principle should be 
that to the extent these agreements embody social policy provisions they must be subject 
to ratification by sub-national governments as is currently the practice in Canada.  
  In macroeconomic governance, supranational institutions such as the IMF and the 
World Bank are assuming ever larger roles.  Within the nation, independent central banks 
and sub-national governments are seeking enhanced roles in macroeconomic 
management leading to a diminished direct role of federal government in stabilization 
and macroeconomic control. The federal government’s role in coordination and 
oversight, however, will increase
6.   
 
                                                 
6 Macroeconomic management under decentralized decision making is the subject of an on-going debate.   
An overall conclusion from this controversy is that, contrary to common misconception, decentralized 
fiscal systems offer a greater potential for improved macroeconomic governance than centralized fiscal 
systems (see Shah, 1998 for a summary of the debate and Shah, Thompson and Zou, 2004, for empirical 
evidence).  
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Emerging Jurisdictional Realignments 
  Box 1 presents a newer federalism perspective on the assignment of 
responsibilities by taking into account the considerations noted above.  This box shows 
that functions such as regulation of financial transactions, international trade, the global 
environment, and international migration will gradually pass upwards (centralized) 
beyond nation states, some sub-national functions such as training will have greater 
central government inputs (centralization) and local functions would gradually be 
completely decentralized and would  involve greater participation by civil society and the 
private sector. In general, globalization and localization trends reinforce each other while 
diminishing the relative importance and centrality of central governments.  
 
Expenditure re-assignment – progress so far  
Expenditure assignments in DTEs have undergone significant changes in the past 
two decades. In transition economies such changes reflected a new role for the public 
sector in support of a market economy. As a consequence sub-national expenditures 
contracted as a percent of GDP from about 17.2% in 1980 to 10.8% in 1999 (see Figure 
2).  Sub-national expenditures in transition economies as a proportion of total public 
sector expenditures experienced even a sharper decline during the same period from 
44.9% to 22.3% (see Figure 3).  
Box 1. Emerging Rearrangements: Globalization, Centralization and Localization 
Beyond Nation States: International conflict resolution, stabilization, regulation of financial
transactions, corporate taxation, international trade, global environment, telecommunications,
international standards, international migration, surveillance of governance conditions, global security
and risk management, transnational production, investment and technology transfer,  suppression of
money laundering, drug smuggling and terrorism. 
Centralization: Social and environmental policy through international agreements, skills enhancement
for international competitiveness, social safety nets, macroeconomic coordination, oversight and
technical assistance to sub-national governments. 
Regionalization/Localization/privatization: All regional/local functions. 
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Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics (various years) and World Bank Fiscal Indicators. 
(http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm) 





































Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics (various years) and World Bank Fiscal Indicators. 
(http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm) 
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In developing countries, on the other hand, there has been a gradual, generally 
piecemeal yet persistent decentralization of expenditure responsibilities. Sub-national 
expenditures in developing countries as a percent of GDP rose from 3% of GDP in 1980 
to 6.1% of GDP in 1997. Sub-national expenditures as a percent of  total public sector 
expenditures increased from 12.7% of total expenditures in 1980 to about 19.6% of total 
in 1998.  Sub-national government’s role in education and health spending show 
divergent trend in transition economies and developing countries (see Figures 4 and 5).  
 
Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics (various years) and World Bank Fiscal Indicators. 
(http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm) 
Figure 4: Education expenditures


































     14   
 Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics (various years) and World Bank Fiscal Indicators. 
(http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm) 
 
In transition economies, sub-national educational expenditures as a percentage of 
public sector education expenditures have declined from 71% in 1981 to 55% in 2000. In 
developing countries, on the other hand, such expenditures have risen from 21% of total 
public sector education expenditures in 1980 to 40% of the same in 2000.   In health, the 
role of sub-national governments in total public sector health expenditures in transition 
economies declined from about 92% in 1977 to 39.2% in 2000. In developing countries, 
the same role expanded from about 22% of total education expenditures to 57% of the 
same in 1999.  These trends, however, hide the wide variations in such ratios across 
countries as shown in Table 2.  
On the high side, in China (56%), India (46%) and Argentina (40%) are 
noteworthy for the relative importance of sub-national expenditures in total public 
expenditures. Moldova (18%) and South Africa (18%) have the highest percentage of 
these expenditures with respect to their GDP. Slovak Republic (8%), Dominican 
Republic (2.6%) are noted for the lowest share of sub-national expenditures in total 
public sector expenditures in transition and developing countries respectively. As a 
percentage of GDP, Croatia (0.01%), Dominican Republic (0.4%), Costa Rica and 
Bahrain (less than 1% of GDP) are noteworthy.     
Figure 5: Health expenditures
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Table 2. Decentralization Indicators for Developing and Transition Economies  
Source: Author’s calculations based on IMF Government Finance Statistics, various years and World Bank Fiscal Indicators.  
(http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm) 
 
Many central governments play a larger direct role in service provision than the 
theory would recommend.  For example, in India, Indonesia, South Africa and Mexico, 
the central government accounts for more than two-thirds of total expenditures.  Even in 
countries where the de jure assignment of expenditures agrees with theoretical principles, 
practices can differ. Brazil and Pakistan are the cases in point. In Brazil, the central 
government has found it difficult to withdraw from some purely local functions such as 
public markets, local schools, and local bridges more than a decade after the adoption of 
the 1988 constitution. In Pakistan, central and provincial governments have a prominent 
role in local functions. In Mexico, the dominance of the central government results from 
both the direct assignment of functions to the federal level and the supposed inability of 
lower governments to assume delegated responsibilities.  In China, Russia and other 
transition economies, state enterprises continue to have a role in local government 
functions. Their redistributive role associated with consumer and producer subsidies 
especially in the housing market is large and threatens the fiscal health of local 
governments.   
Table 3: Central Involvement in Local Functions Remains Extensive  
   Transition  (1999)  Developing  (1997) 
   Average Max Min  Average  Max Min 
Sub-national expenditures          
  As % of GDP  10.8  20.4  5.8  7.4  18.3  0.8 
  As % of public sector expenditures  22.3  38.8  7.3  23.3  45.2  3.5 
  Sub-nat’l education expenditures, as % 
of public sector education 
expenditures 
55.9  91.4 0.2  49.8  97.5 0.2 
  Sub-nat’l health exp., as % of public 
sector health expenditures 
41.9  95.9 0.3  60.2  98.1 13.7 
Sub-national revenues          
  As % of  GDP  7.9  17.1  2.9  5.3  12.5  0.5 
  As % of public sector revenues  18.4  36.0  5.6  16.6  39.8  2.2 
Fiscal transfers          
  As % of sub-national revenues  24.0  50.4  4.1  42.2  80.8  5.0 
Sub-national autonomy          
  Tax  autonomy  55.1  91.0 29.1 40.1  76.5 7.6 
  Expenditure autonomy   74.0  96.2  49.6  58.0  95.0  23.4  
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) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on  World Bank Qualitative Decentralization Indicators.   
(http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/qualitativeindicators.htm 
   Quite a large number of central governments are involved in local functions. Out 
of a sample of 33 countries for which details on the assignment of local functions are 
available, primary education is the sole responsibility of the center in 12 countries and in 
additional 9 countries central government is involved in this service along with local 
governments (see Table 3 for details on central government involvement in local 
functions). 
In areas of shared responsibility such as education, health and social services, 
policies of various levels of government are typically uncoordinated. While social 
services expenditures tend to be less important in developing countries than industrial 
countries, the local government role in these functions is more important in the latter.  
These are also the functions that are in some countries mandated by the constitution to be 
provided universally and free. In transition economies the central governments have often 
attempted to shift social expenditures downward to regional and local governments 
without providing additional finances. These largely unfunded mandates have therefore 
 Service  Number  of  Countries 








Function  Sample Size 
Social Services 
Primary and Preschool 
Education  12 9 12 33 
   Secondary Education  13 8 10 31 
   Public Health  9 14 8  31 
   Hospitals  11 12  4  27 
Transportation  Urban Highways  7 5 17  29 
   Urban Transportation  6 4 12  22 
Utility Services 
Drinking Water and 
Sewerage  8 16 6  30 
   Waste Collection  0 2 27  29 
   Electric Power Supply  8 13 4  25 
Other Services  Fire Protection  0 5 4  9 
   Public Order and Safety 1 1 0  2 
   Police  14 10  5  29  
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been seen as attempts by national governments to shift deficits downward, creating 
disharmony and conflicts among governments at different levels. The division of 
expenditure responsibilities within nations have been further complicated by the role of 
external donors. External donors in their attempt to create “islands of integrity” 
associated with the use of their funds have often supported creation of parallel structures 
of decision making that bypass local government institutions. 
Finally, expenditure autonomy (percentage of own expenditure under effective 
control of sub-national governments), is on average higher (74% for all but 96% in 
Croatia, and 7% in Albania) in transition economies than developing countries (58% for 
all but 95% for Dominican Republic and 23% for South Africa).  
       
b. Taxing Choices: Determining Who Taxes What, At What Rate and How 
 
Four general principles require consideration in assigning taxing powers to 
various governments. First, taxes on mobile factors and tradable goods that have a 
bearing on the efficiency of the internal common market should be assigned to the center. 
Sub-national assignment of taxes on mobile factors may facilitate the use of socially 
wasteful beggar-thy-neighbor policies to attract resources to own areas by regional and 
local governments. In a globalized world even central assignment of taxes on mobile 
capital may not be very effective in the presence of tax havens and difficulty in tracing 
and attributing incomes from virtual transactions to various physical spaces.  Second, 
national equity considerations warrant that progressive redistributive taxes should be 
assigned to the center. This limits the possibility of regional and local governments 
following perverse redistribution policies using both taxes and transfers to attract high 
income persons and repel low income ones. Third, taxes should be assigned to the 
jurisdiction with the best ability to monitor relevant assessments. This minimizes the 
administration costs as well as potential for tax evasion. For example property and land 
taxes are good candidates for local assignment as local governments would be in a better 
position to assess market values of such properties. Fourth, to ensure accountability, 
revenue means (the ability to raise revenues from own sources) should be matched as  
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closely as possible to expenditure needs (see Appendix table 2 for a representative 
assignment of taxing responsibilities).      
The above principles suggest that the case for decentralizing taxing powers is not 
as compelling as that for decentralizing public service delivery. This is because lower 
level taxes can introduce inefficiencies in the allocation of resources across the federation 
and cause inequities among persons of different jurisdictions. In addition, collection and 
compliance costs can increase significantly. These problems are more severe for some 
taxes than others, so the selection of which taxes to decentralize must be done with care 
balancing the need to achieve fiscal and political accountability at the lower levels of 
government against the disadvantages of having a fragmented tax system. The trade-off  
between increased accountability and increased economic costs from decentralizing 
taxing responsibilities can be mitigated by fiscal arrangements that permit joint 
occupation and harmonization of taxes to overcome fragmentation and fiscal equalization 
transfers to reduce fiscal inefficiencies and inequities that arise from different fiscal 
capacities across regional and local governments.   
 
Re-assigning taxing powers – An Update 
The above discussion suggests that decentralization of taxing powers may not 
fully match the decentralization of expenditure and regulatory functions. However, in 
developing and transition economies centralization of taxing responsibilities is much 
more pronounced than would be based on economic considerations. In some countries 
such as Mexico and Pakistan, the national government raises more than 90% of 
consolidated public sector revenues. Revenue systems in developing and transition 
economies are typically characterized by a large and dominant central government role 
and a heavy reliance on indirect taxes such as VAT, excises, taxes on external trade and 
fuel taxes. Sub-national sales taxes are permitted in a number of countries including 
Brazil, India, Russia and Kyrgyz Republic.  Sub-national level VAT is vogue only in 
Brazil (see Shah 2001, 1988, 1994 for practical difficulties with a sub-national VAT) but 
several Indian states have introduced multi-stage sales taxes. Local governments have 
very limited access to own source revenues such as property taxes and user charges and 
even for these limited tax bases, they typically have autonomy only with respect to rate  
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setting within limits. Even the property related taxes in some countries are under central 
control. In China and Indonesia, the central government levies taxes on land, property 
and housing, and in India state governments levy an urban property tax and taxes on 
property transactions. In Brazil the rural property tax is in the federal domain, in Nigeria 
state governments tax non-agricultural land and in Pakistan provincial governments are 
empowered to tax agricultural land. Private sector participation in collecting taxes and 
user fees on behalf of local governments is practiced in some countries. For example, tax 
farming whereby rights for revenue collection are auctioned, is practiced by local 
governments in Pakistan for collecting taxes and user fees.   
Sub-national own revenues constitute about 7.9% of GDP in transition economies 
(11% in Moldova, 10% in Belarus and 0.01% in Croatia) and 5.5% of GDP in developing 
countries (8% in Argentina, less than 1% in Bahrain, Indonesia and Mauritius and 0.1% 
in Dominican Republic) in 1999 (see Figure 6).  In transition economies, on average sub-
national governments raise 18.4% of revenues of public sector revenues (52% in China, 
and 3% in Albania) and in developing countries they raise slightly less – about 16.6% 
(39% in Argentina and India and 0.8% in Dominican Republic) in 1997 (see Figure 7). 
During the past two decades, transition economies have shown a decline in these 
revenues as tax collection was centralized whereas in developing countries, there has 
been a modest increase due to small degree of tax decentralization.  Sub-national 
revenues financed 55% of sub-national operating expenditures in transition economies 
(71% in Lithuania  and 70% in Moldova, and 2% in Albania) and 40% of the same in 
developing countries (78% in Argentina, 63% in Costa Rica and 7% in Peru and South 
Africa) in 1999. The rest of the financing comes from shared taxes, transfers and 
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Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics, various years and World Bank Fiscal Indicators 
(http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm) 
 
The above discussion implicitly assumes that assignment of taxes entails control 
over the tax base, tax rates and collection authority. This need not be the case and higher 
level governments may instead, in the interest of harmonization and minimizing 
collection and compliance costs, allow lower level governments to either levy a 
supplementary rate on own base (tax base sharing) or agree to share the proceeds from 
specific taxes in a pre-determined way (shared taxes). Under such arrangements, tax base 
determination usually rests with the higher-level government with lower levels of 
government levying supplementary rates on the same base. Tax collection is by one level 
of government, generally the central government in market economies and the local 
government in transition economies with proceeds shared downward or upward 
depending upon revenue yields. Only a handful of developing and transition economies 
have adopted tax base sharing.  A sub-national surcharge on the personal income tax is 
permitted in Brazil and Croatia. Russia allows a surcharge on the corporate income tax. 
Provincial governments in Pakistan allow local governments to have a supplementary 
rate on property transfer taxes. While the practice of tax base sharing is uncommon, 
sharing the proceeds of various taxes on a tax by tax basis is frequently practiced in 
DTEs. In transition economies, in 1999, 49.3% of sub-national government revenues 
Figure 7: Sub-national revenue
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were obtained from shared taxes (see World Bank, 2001).  In developing countries, the 
role of shared taxes in financing sub-national governments is of lesser significance as 
general revenue sharing is widely practiced.    
 
c. Designing Fiscal Transfers: Dividing the spoils or creating an enabling framework 
for innovative and competitive service delivery 
 
Intergovernmental transfers are the dominant source of revenues for sub-national 
governments in most DTEs. In 1999, they constituted on average 24% of total revenues 
for transition economies (93% in Albania and 4% in Croatia) and 42% (81% in South 
Africa, 75% in Peru and 7% in China) of the same (in 1997) for developing countries.  
This ratio ranges from 4% to 81% for individual countries.  The transfers constituted 75-
95% of sub-national revenues in Indonesia, Nigeria, Mexico, Pakistan and South Africa. 
The design of these transfers is of critical importance for efficiency and equity of local 
service provision and fiscal health of sub-national governments (see Appendix table 3 for 
general principles and better practices in grant design). For enhancing accountability it is 
desirable to match revenue means (the ability to raise revenues from own sources) as 
closely as possible with expenditure needs at all levels of government. However, higher 
level governments must be allowed greater access to revenues than needed to fulfill own 
direct service responsibilities so that they are able to use their spending power through 
fiscal transfers to fulfill national and regional efficiency and equity objectives. We can 
identify six broad objectives for national fiscal transfers each of which may apply to 
varying degrees in different countries.   
    
i. To bridge a fiscal gap  
 
An imbalance between the revenue-raising ability of regional and local governments 
and their expenditure responsibilities might arise for three reasons. For one, there may be 
inappropriate assignment of taxing and spending responsibilities such that expenditure 
needs of sub-national governments exceed their revenue means. Second, it may be more 
efficient for the national government to collect tax revenues on behalf of the states and turn  
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the funds over to them to allow them to carry out their expenditure responsibilities to avoid 
the tax competition, interregional tax distortions and beggar thy neighbor policies that 
might otherwise exist which would preclude the states from raising the optimal amount of 
revenues on their own. Third, a fiscal gap may come about endogenously because it is 
necessary for the national government to occupy more tax room than it needs in order to be 
able to undertake a number of its fiscal responsibilities, including managing the 
macro-economy, maintaining a harmonized tax system, and making the fiscal transfers that 
it needs to make to satisfy the objectives of such transfers. To correct problems associated 
with the first two kinds of imbalances, joint occupancy of some tax fields or 
decentralization of some taxes are advocated. Unconditional grants or revenue sharing 
based on the origin/derivation (point of collection) principle are also appropriate solutions 
to these problems. To deal with tax competition, higher revenue effort by the national 
government and unconditional grants are required. Finally, to deal with the last type of 
imbalance some form of tax abatement by the national government is necessary to provide 
more tax room in fields jointly occupied with the lower levels of government. This would, 
however, imply scaling back national role in some expenditure areas.  
In DTEs, general revenue sharing are typically used to deal with fiscal gap. A 
number of countries including China, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa have in the 
past tried deficit grants to fill fiscal gaps at sub-national levels with unwelcome results in 
terms of mushrooming of sub-national deficits. These grants are still in vogue in China, 
Hungary and South Africa.    
 
ii. To correct fiscal inequities and fiscal inefficiencies arising from differentials in regional 
fiscal capacities   
 
Decentralized decision making results in differential net fiscal benefits (imputed 
benefits from public spending minus tax burden) being realized by citizens depending upon 
the fiscal capacities of their place of residence.  A rich jurisdiction can provide a higher 
level of public services at a lower tax rate. It is argued that such differential net fiscal 
benefits (NFBs) would lead to unequal treatment of citizens with identical private incomes 
depending on their place of residence. This is because their after tax income inclusive of  
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NFBs would be vary by place of residence. Such NFBs also encourage people to move to a 
resource rich area, although appropriate economic opportunities may not exist. Thus 
resource allocation would be inefficient, because people in their relocation decisions would 
compare gross income (private income plus net benefits minus cost of moving) at new 
locations whereas economic efficiency considerations warrant comparing private income 
minus moving costs. Thus a nation which values horizontal equity (i.e., the equal treatment 
of all citizens nationwide) and fiscal efficiency will need to correct the fiscal inequity and 
fiscal inefficiency which naturally arise in a decentralized government. As argued earlier, 
regional governments with their own expenditure and taxation responsibilities will be able 
to provide their residents different NFBs from their differing fiscal capacities. In a 
centralized unity country, they would not arise as the central government would provide 
comparable services to all citizens using a national tax system. Central-state grants can 
eliminate these differences in NFBs if the transfers to each region depend upon the tax 
capacity of the region relative to others and upon the relative need for and cost of providing 
regional public services. The more decentralized the tax system is, the greater the need for 
equalizing transfers.   
Most transition economies have equalization components in their grant programs to 
sub-national governments. Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia and Ukraine have 
adopted transfer formulae that explicitly incorporate either fiscal capacity and/or 
expenditure need equalization concerns.  In developing countries, programs using an 
explicit standard of equalization are untried, although equalization objectives are implicitly 
attempted in the general revenue sharing mechanisms used in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,    
India, Nigeria, Mexico, Pakistan and South Africa. These mechanisms typically combine 
diverse and conflicting objectives into the same formula and fall significantly short on 
individual objectives. Because the formulae lack explicit equalization standards, they fail to 
address regional equity objectives satisfactorily.  
 
iii. To compensate for benefit spillovers 
 
This is the traditional argument for matching conditional grants. Regional and local 
governments will not have the proper incentive to provide the correct levels of services  
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which yield spillover benefits to residents of other jurisdictions. A system of open-ended 
matching grants based on the expenditures giving rise to the spillovers will provide the 
incentive to increase expenditures. Typically, the extent of the spillover will be difficult to 
measure so the correct matching rate to use will be somewhat arbitrary.  
Although benefit-cost spill-out is a serious factor in a number of countries such 
transfers have not been implemented in developing countries with the single exception of 
South Africa. South Africa provides a closed-ended matching grant to teaching hospitals 
based upon an estimate of benefit spillovers associated with enrollment of non-local 
students and use of hospital facilities by non-residents.  
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iv. Setting national minimum standards to preserve the internal common market and attain 
national equity objectives 
 
 Setting national minimum standards in regional-local services may be important for 
two reasons. The first is that there is an advantage to the nation as a whole from such 
standards as these will contribute to the free flow of goods and services, labor and capital 
and reduce wasteful inter-jurisdictional expenditure competition, and will therefore 
improve the gains from trade from the internal common market. Second, these standards 
serve national equity objectives. Many public services provided at the sub-national level 
such as education, health and social welfare are redistributive in their intent, providing 
in-kind redistribution to residents. In a federal system, lower level provision of such 
services – while desirable for efficiency, preference matching, and accountability – create 
difficulty in fulfilling federal equity objectives. Factor mobility and tax competition create 
strong incentives for lower level governments to under-provide such services and to restrict 
access to those most in need, such as the poor and the old. This is justified by their greater 
susceptibility to disease and potentially greater risks for cost curtailment.  Such perverse 
incentives can be alleviated by conditional non-matching grants where the conditions 
reflect national efficiency and equity concerns, and where there is a financial penalty 
associated with failure to comply with any of the conditions. Thus conditions will not be on 
the specific use of grant funds but attainment of standards in quality, access and level of 
services. Such grants do not affect local government incentives for cost efficiency but do 
encourage compliance with nationally specified standards for access and level of services. 
Properly designed conditional non-matching transfers can create incentives for innovative 
and competitive approaches to improved service delivery (see Box 2 for an example of 
such a grant).   
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Conditional non-matching transfers to ensure national minimum standard are rarely 
used in DTEs. Central government transfers to provincial and local governments in 
Indonesia (the former roads and education grants), central per capita transfers for education 
in Colombia and South Africa, and the capitation grant to Malaysian states come close to 
the concept of such a transfer.   
 
v. To influence local priorities in areas of high national but low local priority 
 
In a federation, there is always some degree of conflict among priorities established 
by various levels of government. One way to induce lower level governments to follow 
priorities established by the higher level government is for the higher level government to 
use its powers of the purse, the so-called spending power. Matching transfers are often used 
to influence lower level priorities. Both the national and intermediate level governments 
could legitimately pursue such policies.  
Open-ended matching transfers with matching rate (percent of expenditures 
financed from own sources by the recipient) to vary inversely with fiscal capacity would be 
consistent with this use. The use of ad hoc grants or open-ended matching transfers for 
local tax effort would be inadvisable. The former is unlikely to have behavioral responses 
consistent with grantor’s objectives and the open-ended nature of the latter may create 
budgetary difficulties for the grantor. India, Malaysia, and Pakistan use conditional closed 
ended matching programs. Pakistan in late 1990s got into serious difficulty by offering 
open-ended matching transfers for provincial tax effort. Central government had to 
abandon this program in midstream as it could not meet its obligations under the program.   
 
Box 2: An Example of a Performance Oriented Grant: Education grant to set minimum 
standards while encouraging competition and innovation 
Allocation basis among local governments: School age population. 
Distribution to providers: Equal per pupil to both government and private schools. 
Conditions: Universal access to primary and secondary education regardless of parents’ 
income; improvements in achievement scores; no condition on the use of grant funds. 
Penalties for non-compliance with standards: public censure, reduction of grant funds. 
Incentives for cost efficiency: retention of savings. 
Source: Shah (1998)  
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vi. To create macroeconomic stability in depressed regions 
 
Fiscal transfers can be used to serve central government objectives in regional 
stabilization. For this purpose capital grants would be appropriate provided funds for future 
upkeep of facilities were available. Experience with capital grants shows that such grants 
often create facilities that are later not maintained by sub-national governments as they 
either remain unconvinced of the utility of such facilities or do not have the means to 
provide a regular upkeep. In view of this difficulty, it may be best to limit the use of capital 
grants by requiring matching funds from recipients and by encouraging private sector 
participation in infrastructure by providing political and policy risk guarantees.  
Capital grants are pervasive in DTEs and most countries have complex processes 
for initiation and approval of submissions for financing capital projects. These processes 
are greatly susceptible to lobbying, political pressures and grantmanship and favor projects 
that give the central government greater visibility. The projects typically lack citizen and 
stakeholder participation and often fail due to proper local ownership, interest and 
oversight. The requirement for matching funds helps in monitoring and evaluation of 
projects and in building local ownership.  
   
Special issues in state/province-local transfers 
General purpose transfers to local governments require special considerations as 
local governments vary in population, size, area served and the type of services offered 
e.g. urban vs rural. In view of this, it would be advisable to classify local governments by 
population size, municipality type, and urban/rural distinction and have a separate 
formula for each class of municipalities. Some common useful components in these 
formulae are: equal per municipality component, equal per capita component, service 
area component and fiscal capacity component. The grant funds should vary directly with 
service area but inversely with fiscal capacity.   
 
d. Facilitating Responsible Credit Market Access  
Needs for capital finance to overcome infrastructure deficiencies are of 
astronomical proportions in DTEs and could not be financed from current revenues and  
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transfers. Facilitating local credit market access can also reduce the need for beggar-thy-
neighbor policies by local governments. Local access to credit requires well functioning 
financial markets and credit worthy local governments. These pre-requisites are easily 
met in industrial countries. In spite of this, traditions for assisting local governments by 
higher-level governments are well established in these countries.   
    In developing countries, undeveloped markets for long term credit and weak 
municipal creditworthiness limit municipal access to credit. Nevertheless, the 
predominant central government policy emphasis is on central controls and consequently 
less attention has been paid to assistance for borrowing. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile 
and Colombia have cooperative controls on domestic borrowing and administrative 
controls on foreign borrowing. Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico and Peru have 
administrative controls on domestic borrowing. India, Indonesia, Korea and Peru have 
also administrative controls on foreign borrowing. Foreign borrowing is prohibited in 
Thailand, Pakistan, Armenia, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania, 
Poland, Russia and Slovenia. Domestic borrowing is prohibited in Ethiopia, Mexico, 
Thailand  (see World Bank, 1999/2000 and  World Bank, 2001). Almost all DTEs with 
the exception of South Africa and Hungary do not have a regulatory framework for 
declaring local government bankruptcy. In a few countries such assistance is available 
through specialized institutions and central guarantees to jump start municipal access to 
credit. The menu of choices available to local governments for financing capital projects 
are quite limited and available alternatives are not conducive to developing a sustainable 
institutional environment for such finance. This is because macroeconomic instability and 
lack of fiscal discipline and appropriate regulatory regimes have impeded the 
development of financial and capital markets. In addition, revenue capacity at the local 
level is limited due to tax centralization. A first transitory step to provide limited credit 
market access to local governments may be to establish municipal finance corporations 
run on commercial principles and to encourage the development of municipal rating 
agencies to assist in such borrowing. Tax decentralization is also important to establish 
private sector confidence in lending to local governments and sharing in the risks and 
rewards of such lending.  
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e. Oversight of Local Governments: Freedom and Responsibility within Boundaries 
 
  Monitoring and oversight of  local governments is an area of concern in both 
federal and unitary countries alike.  For example, the Republic of South Africa 
Constitution Act 1996 (Section 139(1) (b)) provides for a disbandment of local 
government in the event of failure to (i) “maintain national standards or meet minimum 
standards of service”; (ii) “prevent actions prejudicial to the interests of another 
municipality or the nation as a whole”; and (iii) “maintain economic unity.”  It further 
provides for withholding of tax shares and transfers for non-compliance with tax effort 
(Section 227(2)). The constitutional obligations regarding these provisions require a 
significant and superior evaluation capacity at provincial and national levels. Evaluative 
measures that can assist in this oversight include fiscal rules for expenditure and debt 
creation and management, requirement of annual commercial corporate audit of local 
governments; fiscal capacity measurement using a common yardstick i.e. equalization of 
municipal assessments; greater emphasis on formula grants over project grants in 
provincial-local transfers; greater emphasis on public-private-civil society partnership in 
public provision; opinion polls on service standards and citizen satisfaction;  and 
performance ratings of local governments based upon outputs, outcomes and citizen 
satisfaction. 
Oversight of local governments is typically exercised through process and input 
controls in DTEs. Such controls compromise local autonomy without advancing national 
objectives. In 1999, central governments exercised some control over 25% of sub-
national expenditures in transition economies and over nearly half of the same in 
developing countries (see Figure 8).  Local autonomy accompanied by accountability to 
citizens for service delivery offers a better alternative in local government oversight. 
Thus local governments should have the freedom to raise money from local residents and 
spend as they wish and also to hire and fire personnel as they please. In a study of 29 
public organizations in six developing countries, Grindle (1999) found that where 
decentralization was matched by such local autonomy and oversight, governments were 
“good performers” (achieving high levels of capacity, completed tasks, responsiveness 
and effectiveness).   
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As an alternative to centralized controls, some governments have developed ways 
of relating higher to lower level governments through results-oriented lines of 
accountability that do not stifle performance..  The model of decentralization for health 
care in Brazil is an example.  Results-oriented contracts are developed between central 
government (providing funds) and local clinics (providing services), ensuring 
accountability between levels of government without a process bias. The contract system 
institutionalizes greater autonomy for local governments than do other decentralization 
regimes, holding them accountable for their results—and not binding their processes. The 
creation of ‘vigilance committees’ in Bolivia follows the same principle.  These 
committees are constituted from representatives of civil society organizations and are 
charged with monitoring performance of local governments in fulfilling their mandates in 
service delivery and achieving local citizens’ satisfaction and reporting the results to 
central authorities. 
  
f. Ensuring a fair suck of the sauce bottle: institutional considerations 
 
  Adherence to federalism principles or “getting prices right” or even “getting the 
rules of the game right” as discussed earlier is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
the success of decentralized decision making. Complementary formal and informal 
institutions are needed to ensure that all players in the game adhere to agreed upon set of 
ground rules and deviant behavior is properly dealt with. In the following, we discuss 
selected aspects of this consideration. 
 
Institutions and processes of intergovernmental coordination 
  Federal countries require both formal and informal institutions of intergovernmental 
coordination. In some federal countries, areas of potential conflict among different levels of 
government are minimized through clear separation of national and sub-national 
responsibilities (the so-called layer-cake model of federalism as practiced in Australia, 
Canada, India and Pakistan) and the two levels interact through meetings of officials and 
ministers (executive federalism) and in Australia, India and Pakistan through federal 
unilateralism. Some countries place a greater premium on a common response through  
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shared or joint tasks such as Germany, a federal country and the Republic of South Africa, 
a pseudo federal country. In these countries, in addition to executive federalism, the upper 
houses of parliament (Bundesrat and the Council of Provinces) play a key role in 
intergovernmental coordination. In countries with overlapping responsibilities (the so-
called marble cake model of federalism), such as United States and Brazil, state lobby of 
Congress and interstate relations serve coordinating roles. In China, where growth concerns 
have imposed a federalism structure on a unitary country, regional communist party 
officials/ governors exercise a moderating influence on the otherwise monolithic 
orientation of the State Council.      
  Constitutional provisions per se can also provide coordinating influences. For 
example, in some federal countries, constitutional provisions require that all legislation 
recognize that ultimate power rests with the people. For example, all legislation in Canada 
must conform to the Canadian Charter of Rights.  In Switzerland, a confederation by law 
but a federal country in practice, major legislative changes require approval by referenda. 
In Switzerland, there is also a strong tradition of coordination through consensus initiatives 
by cantons. 
 
Institutional arrangements for fiscal relations 
  The structure of intergovernmental fiscal relations, especially the system of grants, 
must be determined by some body. There are five main alternatives. The first is for the 
federal government alone to decide on it.  This alternative negates federalism and would 
not be acceptable in many countries.  The second is to set up a quasi-independent body, 
such as a grants commission, whose purpose is to design and reform the system as 
practiced in Australia, India and the Republic of South Africa. This alternative is prone to 
more ideal solutions rather than pragmatic approaches and therefore runs the risk of 
presenting complex solutions and recommendations that may not be politically palatable.  
The third alternative is to use federal-state committees to negotiate the terms of the system 
as done in Canada.  The fourth alternative is to have a joint intergovernmental cum inter-
legislative commission such as the Finance Commission in Pakistan and the fifth 
alternative is to have an intergovernmental legislative body such as the upper house of the 
German Parliament (Bundesrat) as in Germany. The latter three systems allow for explicit  
     33   
political inputs from the jurisdictions involved, and therefore likely to opt for simple and 
feasible but less than ideal (compromise) solutions. 
 
Institutions of accountability 
  Institutions of accountability hold the key to the success of decentralized decision-
making. This entails institutions and mechanisms for citizens voice and exit, norms and 
networks of civic engagement (“social capital” according to Putnam), social consensus 
(Williamson, 1994 and Weingast, 1993), preservation instinct of a “stationary bandit” who 
monopolizes and rationalizes theft in the form of taxes (Olson, 1993), judicial 
accountability, and vertical and horizontal accountability.  Citizen voice and exit require 
institutions of democratic participation and accountability provisions for elected officials. 
The origins and success of decentralization programs in Latin America is traceable to the 
democratic traditions that emerged across the continent in late 1980s. In the Philippines, 
recently enacted local government legislation, while empowering these governments, has 
provided for regular elections and recall of elected officials for a breach of public trust (see 
the Republic of Philippines Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code, 1991). While 
norms and networks of civic engagement were reasonably well developed in the pre-
colonial traditionalist societies found in many developing countries, such as the Panchayat 
Raj in Pre-British India, these institutions withered away either under the colonial rule or 
subsequently under centralized bureaucratic governance structures. The net result has been 
the rise of opportunism and social distrust culminating in dysfunctional societies when 
formal institutions of governance failed. The African and the South Asian development 
failures share this common underpinning.   
Societal consensus on economic and political rights is also conducive to 
accountability at all levels. According to Weingast (1993), this consensus need not take any 
formal expression but would work so long as a majority of people share a common belief 
as to the limits of government intervention and are willing to police those limits by 
withdrawing their support from a government that fails to abide by them (see Weingast, 
1993, p. 306).  Preservation instincts of a stationary bandit also respect accountability (see 
Olson, 1993). This is because the stationary bandit strengthens his grip on power, so long 
as economic performance is strong and citizens see their well being improved. This partly  
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explains the success of the Asian Tigers and the failure of some South/Southeast Asian 
regimes. The latter regimes were controlled by “roving bandits” whose main aim was to 
pad their overseas bank accounts and then disappear in a foreign haven.   
  Judicial accountability strengthens the credibility of public commitments.  This is 
particularly important for transition economies, where framework laws on property rights, 
corporate legal ownership and control, bankruptcy, and financial accounting and control are 
not fully developed.  Interestingly enough, judicial accountability is much more difficult to 
enforce in a parliamentary democracy than in a presidential system that respects separation 
of the legislative and executive functions. This is because under a parliamentary 
democracy, the executive branch can override judicial accountability by amending the 
legislation - a game played ad infinitum in Pakistan to undermine a decentralized federal 
constitution.  Judicial accountability is further compromised under a British style civil 
service organization as in India and Pakistan (until 2001), where divisional and district 
commissioners hold simultaneously executive, legislative and judicial powers.  As noted 
by Montesquieu (1970), such a situation is ripe for the abuse of powers as “ ... When the 
legislative and executive powers are united in the same body of magistrates, there can be 
no liberty;... Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power is not separated from the 
legislative and executive” (Montesquieu, 1970, p. 397). 
 
Traditional channels of accountability 
 
  The audit, inspection and control functions should be strengthened, since they tend 
to be quite weak in transition and developing economies. The auditor-general should be 
given greater authority and autonomy in exercising his mandate. At the same time, a case 
can be made for loosening the constraints of the central planning process in developing 
countries. Central plans lead to a centralization of authority; reductions in flexibility, 
innovation and autonomy at the local level; and delays in private sector activity.  
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5. Aligning Operational Capacity with the Authorizing Environment 
 
In DTEs operational capacity for local governance is deficient. However, this 
deficiency can be overcome in the short run by borrowing such capacities from the 
national government, other local governments and the private sector and civil society. In 
the long run, training staff and creating an enabling environment for competitive service 
delivery through partnership with the private sector and civil society can augment 
operational capacity. A matter of greater concern in DTEs is that the available capacity is 
not geared toward serving the citizen-voters. A similar bureaucratic culture prevailed in 
Western Europe not long ago. German philosopher Nietzsche characterized the 
government as “coldest of all cold monsters – whatever it says it lies – and whatever it 
has – it has stolen.” Over the years, industrial countries have shown a remarkable change 
in the performance of their public sectors. It is interesting to note that this change was 
brought about not through a system of hierarchical controls, as is the focus in most 
developing countries, but more through strengthened accountability to citizens at large. 
This was done by creating a political-legal-fiscal framework for citizen-centric 
governance (see Andrews and Shah, 2003).  The elected representatives made a 
commitment along the lines of the oath required of the members of the city of Athens 
which stated that: 
“We will strive increasingly to quicken the public sense of public duty; 
That thus…we will transmit this city  
Not only not less, but greater, better and more beautiful 
Than it was transmitted to us.”      
 
In modern times, such a commitment to accountability for results got firmly 
grounded in the political culture of industrial countries. This accountability for results 
was further strengthened by accountability of the executive to the legislature branch and 
through creation of charter of rights for individuals to demand accountability from their 
governments.  An important element of these systems of accountability has been to bring 
about a change in both the bureaucratic culture and the incentives public employees face. 
This is done by steering attention away from internal bureaucratic processes and input 
controls (hard controls) to accountability for results (soft controls). While various  
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countries have followed diverse policies to achieve this transformation, the underlying 
framework driving these reforms is uniform and firmly grounded in a citizen-centered 
governance framework. The results oriented management and evaluation framework 
(ROME) serves to operationalize elements of this broader framework of bottom-up 
accountability. Under ROME, a results based chain provides a yardstick for measuring 
public sector performance.  
 
Results Oriented Management and Evaluation (ROME) Chain: 
Program/project => inputs=> activities=> outputs=>reach (stakeholders positively or 
adversely affected)=> outcome (purpose) => impact (goal)=> citizen feedback and 
evaluations=>program design => program/project 
Most ROME related approaches have the following common elements: (a) 
Contracts/work programs based upon pre-specified output and performance targets and 
budgetary allocations; (b) Managerial flexibility but accountability for results; (c) 
Subsidiarity principle; (d) Incentives for cost efficiency and (e) Citizen charter, bottom-
up accountability. 
ROME provides a coherent framework for strategic planning and management 
based upon learning and accountability in a decentralized environment.  As the focus of 
the approach is on learning, failure to meet commitments in the short run may be 
tolerated but a failure to share values and persistent failure to meet commitments invite 
severe sanctions.  The ROME framework calls for competitive wages and task 
specialization and lack of formal tenures for public personnel. Public providers are given 
the freedom to succeed or fail. Instead public employees hold the jobs so long as they are 
able to fulfill the terms of their contracts. Persistent failures initiate the exit process. 
Responsiveness to citizenry and accountability for results are the cornerstone of this 
approach. A recent empirical study by Gurgur and Shah (1999) supports this view as it 
shows that political and bureaucratic culture and centralization of authority represent the 
most significant determinants of corruption in a sample of 30 countries. In view of this 
evidence, the ROME framework offers a great potential in developing countries to 
improve public sector governance by nurturing a responsive and accountable governance.   
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6. Adapting to a Changing World with Learning From and Inspiring Each Other  
 
 
  The DTEs have undergone a major transformation of their public sector in the last 
decade. The transition economies have rapidly moved from central planning to market 
dominated economies whereas the progress in developing countries to move decision 
making closer to the people remains painfully slow and modest. The DTEs have also 
attempted to forge a new partnership within and beyond governments with varying 
degrees of commitment and success. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
India, Malaysia and Poland represent examples of achieving a stable authorizing 
environment - where there is a significant degree of societal consensus on the roles and 
responsibilities of various levels of government and their partnership with civil society.  
Other countries, such as China, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, Russia, and 
Uganda, are still groping for a consensus on the right balance. In some other countries in 
Africa, and Central and East Asia, these issues have not yet received the political 
attention they deserve. Thus for a large number of DTEs, the quest for the right balance 
remains largely elusive. Further progress on this agenda requires learning from past 
experiences of industrial countries as well as more recent experiences of DTEs. In this 
paper, we have reviewed the DTE experiences while using an analytical framework that 
draws on experiences in both industrial and non-industrial countries. The following 
important lessons can be distilled from this review. 
•  Periodic review of jurisdictional assignments is essential to realign responsibilities 
with changing economic and political realities. With globalization and localization, 
the national government’s direct role in stabilization and macroeconomic control is 
likely to diminish over time, but its role in social protection, education, training, skills 
enhancement, coordination and oversight is expected to increase as regimes and sub-
national governments assume enhanced roles in some of its areas of traditional 
responsibility. Constitutional and legal systems and institutions must be amenable to 
timely adjustments to adapt to changing circumstances.   
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•  An enabling environment for decentralization, i.e. institutions of citizen participation 
and accountability, must be addressed in any serious reform of fiscal systems. These 
elements have not been sufficiently addressed in most reform efforts.   
•  Civil service reform is critical to the success of a decentralization program. Such a 
reform must ensure that the center has no direct say in the recruitment and promotions 
of civil servants, other than overseeing that standards of transparency and fairness are 
met at the sub-national levels and that wages of sub-national services must be 
competitive with the central government. Further, the civil service incentive structure 
should reward service orientation and performance and discourage command and 
control and rent seeking. This can be accomplished through performance contracts, 
stay-with-it culture, recognition of specialized skills and evaluation systems that link 
performance, rewards and budgeting. 
•  Traditional administrative capacity matters but should not be considered as an 
impediment to decentralization.  Administrative capacity to develop and maintain 
modern organizational practices such as budgeting, auditing and accounting systems 
is no doubt important but should not be considered as a barrier to decentralization 
provided citizen participation and transparency in decision making is ensured.  This is 
because technical capacity can be borrowed from supportive higher-level 
governments and elsewhere. 
•  Asymmetric decentralization as provided under the Indonesian decentralization 
program and under provincial local government ordinances in Pakistan offers a 
thoughtful approach to decentralization.  Regardless of the availability of help from 
higher level governments, lack of institutional capacity should never be considered as 
an excuse not to decentralize. Instead, an objective program of decentralization that 
recognizes the nature and type of local government, its clientele and its fiscal capacity 
can be developed and various local governments can be assigned differential powers 
by taking into account the above mentioned factors. 
•  A major separation of spending and taxing decisions leads to lack of accountability in 
the public sector.  In the event of such de-linking, the role of conditional (conditional 
on standards of services and access to such services and not on expenditures) block 
transfers is worth examining to enhance accountability.  
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•  Intergovernmental transfers in developing countries undermine fiscal discipline and 
accountability while building transfer dependencies that cause a slow economic 
strangulation of fiscally disadvantaged regions.  Properly designed intergovernmental 
transfers on the other hand can enhance competition for the supply of public goods, 
fiscal harmonization, sub-national government accountability and regional equity.  
•  The role of fiscal transfers in enhancing competition for the supply of public goods 
should not be overlooked.  For example, transfers for basic health and primary 
education could be made available to both the public sector and the not-for-profit 
private sector on an equal basis using as criteria the demographics of the population 
served, school age population and student enrollments, etc. This would promote 
competition and innovation as both public and private institutions would compete for 
public funding. Such financing options are especially attractive for providing greater 
access to public services in rural areas. 
•  Fiscal rules accompanied by “gate keeper” intergovernmental councils/committees 
provide a useful framework for fiscal discipline and fiscal policy coordination. In this 
context, one can draw on industrial countries’ experiences with “golden rules”, 
Maastricht type guidelines and “common budget directives” to develop country 
specific guidelines.  To ensure voluntary compliance with the guidelines, an 
appropriate institutional framework must be developed. Transparency of the 
budgetary processes and institutions, accountability to the electorate and general 
availability of comparative data on fiscal positions of all levels of government further 
strengthen fiscal discipline.   
•  To ensure fiscal discipline, governments at all levels must be made to face the 
financial consequences of their decisions. This is possible if the central government 
does not backstop state and local debt and the central bank does not act as a lender of 
last resort to the central government. In addition, ownership and preferential access to 
the financial sector should not be available to any level of government. In such an 
environment capital markets and bond rating agencies would provide an effective 
fiscal policy discipline.     
•  Societal norms and consensus on the roles of various levels of governments and limits 
to their authority are vital for the success of decentralized decision making.  In the  
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absence of such norms and consensus, direct central controls do not work and 
intergovernmental gaming leads to dysfunctional constitutions. 
•  Tax decentralization is a pre-requisite for sub-national credit market access. In 
countries with highly centralized tax bases, unrestrained credit market access by sub-
national governments poses a risk for macro stabilization policies of  the national 
government as the private sector anticipates a higher level government bailout in the 
event of default and does not discount the risks of such lending properly. 
•  Higher-level institutional assistance may be needed for financing local capital 
projects. This assistance can take the form of establishing municipal finance 
corporations run on commercial principles to lower the cost of borrowing by using 
the superior credit rating of the higher level government and municipal rating 
agencies to determine credit worthiness. 
•  An internal common market is best preserved by constitutional guarantees. National 
governments in developing countries have typically failed in this role. 
•  Finally, contrary to a common misconception, a developing country institutional 
environment calls for a greater degree of decentralization than needed for an 
industrial country. For an efficient working of a centralized bureaucracy, advanced 
information gathering and transmittal networks, an efficient and dedicated civil 
service, and well developed institutions of citizen participation and accountability are 
needed. This is possible in the setting of an industrial country environment. A more 
primitive public sector environment is more suited to a decentralized form of 
governance. This is because information requirements and transaction costs are 
minimized by moving the decision making closer to people who are affected by those 
decisions. Closeness also serves to enhance better participation, preference matching 
for public services, transparency and greater accountability. 
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Appendix Table 1 . A Representative Assignment of Expenditure Responsibilities 







Interregional & International 
conflicts resolution 
U  U  N,P  Benefits & costs international in scope 
External trade  U  U,N,S  P      “       “ 
Telecommunications U,  N  P  P National regulation not feasible 
Financial Transactions  U,N  P  P  “      “ 
Environment U,N,S,L  U,N,S,L  N,S,L,P  Externalities of global, national, state and local scope. 
Foreign Direct Investment  N,L  L  P  local infrastructure is critical 
Defense N  N  N,P  Benefits  & costs national in scope 
Foreign Affairs  N  N  N  “ “ 
Monetary policy, currency, banking  U, ICB  ICB  ICB, P  Independence from all levels essential. Some international role for common 
discipline 
Interstate commerce  Constitution, N  N  P  Constitutional safeguards important for factors and goods mobility 
Immigration  U,N  N  N  U due to forced exit 
Transfer payments  N  N  N  Redistribution 
Criminal and civil law  N  N  N  Rule of law , a national concern 
Industrial policy  N  N  P  To avoid beggar-thy neighbour policies 
Regulation N  N,S,L  N,S,L,P   Internal common market 
Fiscal Policy  N  N,S,L  N,S,L,P Coordination  is  possible 
Natural Resources  N  N,S,L  N,S,L,P  Promotes regional equity and internal common market 
Education, Health & Social 
Welfare 
N,S,L  S,L  S,L,P  Transfers in kind 
Highways N,S,L  N,S,L  S,L,P  Benefits  and  costs of various roads vary in scope. 
Parks & Recreation  N,S,L  N,S,L  N,S,L,P  “    “    “ 
Police  S, L  S,L  S,L  Primarily local benefits 
Water, sewer, refuse, fire 
protection 
L  L  L,P  “   “    “ 
Note: U is supranational responsibility, ICB is independent central bank, N is national government, S is state/provincial government, L is local Government and P is non-
government sectors/civil society. Source: Shah (1994). 
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Appendix Table 2:  A representative  assignment of taxing powers 
 
  Determination of  Collection and 
Types of Tax  Base  Rate     Administration            Comments 
 
 
Customs  F  F  F  International trade taxes. 
Corporate income  F, U  F,U  F,U  Mobile factor, stabilization tool. 
Resource taxes    
     Resource rent (profits/income) tax  F  F  F  Highly unequally distributed tax bases. 
     Royalties, fees, charges;   
        severance taxes; production,  
        output, and property taxes  S,L  S,L  S,L  Benefit taxes/charges for state-local services. 
     Conservation charges  S,L  S,L  S,L  To preserve local environment. 
Personal income   F  F,S,L  F  Redistributive, mobile factor, stabilization tool. 
Wealth taxes (taxes on capital, wealth, wealth  
     transfers, inheritances, and bequests)  F  F,S  F  Redistributive. 
Payroll  F,S  F,S  F,S  Benefit charge, e.g., social security coverage. 
Multi-stage sales taxes (value-added tax, [VAT])  F  F  F  Border tax adjustments possible under federal 
              assignment; potential stabilization tool. 
Single stage sales taxes (manufacturer/wholesale/retail) 
     Option A  S  S,L  S,L  Higher compliance cost. 
     Option B  F  S  F  Harmonized, lower compliance cost. 
"Sin" taxes 
     Excises on alcohol and tobacco  F,S  F,S  F,S  Health care a shared responsibility. 
     Betting, gambling  S,L  S,L  S,L  State and local responsibility. 
     Lotteries  S,L  S,L  S,L  State and local responsibility. 
     Race tracks  S,L  S,L  S,L  State and local responsibility. 
Taxation of "Bads" 
     Carbon  F  F  F  To combat global/national pollution. 
     BTU taxes  F,S,L  F,S,L  F,S,L  Pollution impact may be national, regional, or local. 
 
     Motor fuels  F,S,L  F,S,L  F,S,L  Tolls on federal/provincial/local roads. 
     Effluent charges  F,S,L  F,S,L  F,S,L  To deal with interstate, intermunicipal or local pollution issues. 
 
     Congestion tolls  F,S,L  F,S,L  F,S,L  Tolls on federal/provincial/local roads. 
     Parking fees  L  L  L  To control local congestion. 
Motor vehicles   
     Registration, transfer taxes, and annual fees  S  S  S  State responsibility. 
     Driver's licenses and fees S  S  S  State responsibility 
Business taxes  S  S  S  Benefit tax. 
Excises S,L  S,L  S,L  Residence-based  taxes.   
Property   S  L  L  Completely immobile factor, benefit tax. 
Land  S  L  L  Completely immobile factor, benefit tax. 
Frontage, betterment  S,L  L  L  Cost recovery. 
Poll F,S,L  F,S,L  F,S,L  Payment for local services. 
User charges  F,S,L  F,S,L  F,S,L  Payment for services received. 
 
Note:  U is supranational agency,  F is federal, S is state or province, L is municipal or local. 
Source:  Shah (1994).  
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Appendix Table 3. Principles and Better Practices in Grant Design 
Grant Objective  Grant Design  Better Practices  Practices to avoid 
To bridge fiscal gap  •  Reassign responsibilities 
•  Tax abatement 
•  Tax base sharing 
Tax abatement in Canada and 
tax base sharing in Canada, 
Brazil and Pakistan 
Deficit grants 
Tax by tax sharing as in India  
To reduce regional fiscal 
disparities 
General Non-matching Fiscal 
capacity equalization transfers 
Fiscal equalization programs 
of Australia, Canada and 
Germany 
General revenue sharing with 
multiple factors 
To compensate for benefit 
spillovers 
Open-ended matching 
transfers with matching rate 
consistent with spillout of 
benefits 
RSA grant for teaching 
hospitals 
 
Setting national minimum 
standards 
Conditional non-matching 
block transfers with conditions 
on standards of service and 
access 
Indonesia roads and primary 
education grants 
Colombia and Chile education 
transfers 
conditional transfers with 
conditions on spending alone 
ad hoc grants 
Influencing local priorities in 
areas of high national but low 
local priority 
Open-ended matching 
transfers (with preferably 
matching rate to vary 
inversely with fiscal capacity) 
Matching transfers for social 
assistance as in Canada 
ad hoc grants 
Stabilization   capital grants provided 
maintenance possible  
Limit use of capital grants and 
encourage private sector 
participation by providing 
political and policy risk 
guarantee 
stabilization grants with no 
future upkeep requirements 
Source: Shah (1994), Boadway, Roberts and Shah (1994) 
 
 
 
 
 